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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ect of measurement error and manipulation on a principals pref-
erence for whether or not to use a short-term performance measure for ring an agent, whose
competence is unknown. The short-term performance measure is an imperfect signal of the
rms unobservable long-term value, but is subject to manipulation, which, if successful, results
in a favorable performance measure. A competent agents successful manipulation is bene-
cial because it reduces ine¢ cient ring, but an incompetent agents successful manipulation is
costly because of ine¢ cient retention. A more informative signal about the competent agents
performance can either increase or decrease ine¢ cient ring, depending on whether the agents
manipulation is successful. Thus, the principal prefers to ignore short-term performance when
the signal about the competent agents performance is neither accurate nor inaccurate. A more
informative signal about the incompetent agents performance can either increase or decrease
ine¢ cient retention, depending on whether the agents manipulation is successful, and, thus,
has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the value of ignoring short-term performance. The results have
implications for understanding how short-term performance evaluation can be detrimental to
an organizations long-term value due to the costs of the ring and retention errors.
JEL classication: D82, D83, G30, M41
Keywords: performance evaluation, measurement error, manipulation, job retention
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1 Introduction
Many rms use short-term performance measures to evaluate and reward performance, and to
make ring and retention decisions. Short-term performance may be useful as a forecast of the
managers competence and contribution to the rms long-term value, but its usefulness depends
on its quality, or measurement error. As Gibbons (1998) points out, it may be inherently di¢ cult
to measure the e¤ectiveness of an individuals inputs for long-term organizational performance. In
addition, it is well known that reward-based performance can invite gaming, or manipulation
of the performance measure, which a¤ects its quality and e¤ectiveness for decision-making.1 As
Campbell (1979, 85) notes, (t)he more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-
making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort
and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor.2 This paper studies whether a rm
owner nds it optimal to ignore short-term performance for decision-making, when a manager can
manipulate an imperfect short-term performance measure.
The traditional view of performance measure manipulation is that it is dysfunctional, and costly
because it allows an incompetent manager to fool the rm owner. Relatedly, Kerr (1975) highlights
the problem of the inability to measure the performance of a particular task, i.e., that the manager
will focus on the task that is being measured at the cost of other benecial tasks.3 For these and
other reasons, Cable and Vermulean (2016) argue for the abolishment of performance-based pay for
executives, while others have called for less frequent reporting (see Rummell 2008, for example).
However, prior literature emphasizes the benets of performance measure manipulation, including
how a competent manager can use income smoothing to signal his expertise (Demski, 1998), or how
earnings management can prevent a rm owner from ine¢ cient ring due to a lack of commitment
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Arya, et al., 1998). This paper highlights the costs and benets of
performance measure manipulation, and the e¤ect of measurement error on whether a rm owner
nds it valuable to use a short-term performance measure to make a ring decision, or whether it
is valuable to eliminate manipulation by ignoring short-term performance.
I use a principal-agent setting with risk neutral parties, where the agent is protected by limited
1Muller (2018) suggests that gaming performance measures is pervasive in many aspects of society and across
various types of institutions, wherever performance metrics are emphasized.
2Goodharts law and the Lucas critique, although discussed in monetary policy, convey the same message.
3Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992) formalize Kerr (1975), and propose using lower-powered incen-
tives. In related work, Feltham and Xie (1994) study how both noise and the congruence between the agents e¤ect
on a performance measure and the benet to the principal a¤ect performance measurement. Further, Demski, et al.
(2009) show that with multiple tasks, it may not be optimal to use an additional, informative performance measure
due to the e¤ect on task allocation.
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liability. The principal o¤ers a contract to an agent of unknown t with the rm. The contract
species whether short-term performance will be measured, and the ring rule. The short-term
performance measure is an imperfect signal about the rms unobservable long-term value. After
joining the rm, the agent privately learns whether he is competent or incompetent at the rms
productive task. I assume that any report by the agent about his type is unveriable, which means
that the principal cannot use it in contracting.
The rms unobservable long-term value depends on the agents productive e¤ort and his com-
petence, or t with the rm. With high productive e¤ort, the rms long-term value is good, but
with low e¤ort, the rms long-term value may be good or bad. With an incompetent agent, the
rms long-term value is always bad, regardless of productive e¤ort. The benet to the principal of
good long-term value is su¢ ciently high so that the principal is willing to hire an agent of unknown
type, and to motivate the competent agent to provide high e¤ort.
The short-term performance measure is an imperfect, but informative, signal about the rms
long-term value, and its measurement error depends on whether long-term value is good or bad. In
addition, either type of agent may engage in costly activities to manipulate the signal, but these
activities have no e¤ect on long-term value. If the agents manipulation is successful, then the
signal is high, but if the manipulation is unsuccessful, whether the signal is high or low depends on
the extent of the signals measurement error.
The principal commits to whether or not to re the agent. The setting involves a typical ring
rule, which, with a short-term performance measure, means that the principal res the agent when
the signal is low. When the principal res the agent, she receives continuation prots, which could
arise from either hiring another agent or liquidating the rms assets. The continuation prots
are not so large that the principal prefers to hire an agent and to always re the agent. This
means that without a short-term performance measure, the principal will optimally never re the
agent. In addition, the agent privately benets from retaining his job, due, for example, to a higher
reputation when employed, or the transaction costs of nding a new job.
The principal can make two types of costly, decision-making errors, depending on whether
she uses the short-term performance measure. The principal may mistakenly re a competent
agent whose productive e¤ort results in good long-term rm value, or she might mistakenly retain
an incompetent agent, whose e¤ort leads to bad long-term rm value. The ring error is costly
because of the lost benet of good long-term value. The principal only incurs the cost of the ring
error if she uses the short-term performance measure, because without a short-term performance
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measure, she never res the agent. The cost of the retention error is due to the lost continuation
prots. The principal is less likely to incur a retention cost with a short-term performance measure
than without it, because she res the agent when performance is low.
The agents productive incentives depend on whether or not the principal uses the short-term
performance measure to re the agent when it is low. Without ring. i.e., without a short-term
performance measure, because of the lack of a performance measure, the competent agent has no
incentive to provide high productive e¤ort. In contrast, the use of the short-term performance
measure for ring motivates the competent agent to provide high productive e¤ort, as long as the
cost to the agent is su¢ ciently low.
Without manipulation, i.e., when the cost to the agent is innitely high, the principal prefers
to ignore short-term performance when the high signal is less accurate about good long-term rm
value, and when the competent agents productivity with low e¤ort is su¢ ciently high. Without
manipulation, a more informative short-term performance measure increases the principals ex-
pected prots. This is because a more accurate high short-term performance measure about good
long-term rm value means the principal is less likely to mistakenly re the competent agent, which
reduces the cost of the ring error. Similarly, a more accurate low short-term performance measure
about bad long-term rm value reduces the cost of retention error, because the principal is more
likely to correctly re the incompetent agent. Thus, there is a threshold for the accuracy of the
high short-term performance measure, above which the principal prefers to use the short-term per-
formance measure, and which is decreasing in the accuracy of the accuracy of the low short-term
performance measure.
When the agents cost of manipulation is not innitely high, the use of the short-term perfor-
mance measure for ring encourages both types of agents to engage in manipulation, which may or
may not be successful. In equilibrium, the incompetent agents manipulation e¤ort is higher than
the competent agents manipulation, because he is more likely to be red. When the competent
agents manipulation is successful, the principal does not mistakenly re the agent, and this is
benecial to the principal. In contrast, when the incompetent agents manipulation is successful,
the principal mistakenly retains the incompetent agent, and this is costly.
The principal prefers to ignore short-term performance with manipulation for an intermediate
level of the accuracy of the high short-term performance measure. This is driven by the impact of the
accuracy of the short-term performance measure on the agents manipulation. With manipulation,
a more accurate high signal has two opposing e¤ects on the principals expected prots. First, when
3
the competent agents manipulation is unsuccessful, a more accurate high short-term performance
measure means the principal is less likely to re the agent, which increases her expected prots.
Second, a more accurate high short-term performance measure causes the competent agent to
decrease his optimal manipulation, which means that it is less likely to be successful and decreases
the principals expected prots. Which e¤ect dominates depends on the accuracy of the high short-
term performance measure relative to the agents cost of manipulation. For a given manipulation
cost, with a less accurate high short-term performance measure, the second e¤ect dominates, while
with a more accurate high short-term performance measure, the rst e¤ect dominates. Together,
this implies that the principals expected prots are U-shaped in the accuracy of the high short-
term performance measure. Thus, for a less accurate or a more accurate short-term performance
measure, the principal prefers to use the short-term performance measure for the ring decision.
An increase in the accuracy of the low signal can mean that it is more likely that the principal
prefers to ignore the short-term performance measure, but only when the low signal is su¢ ciently
accurate. A more accurate low short-term performance measure also has two opposing e¤ects on the
principals expected prots, due to the incompetent agents manipulation. When the incompetent
agents manipulation is unsuccessful, a more accurate low short-term performance increases the
principals expected prots, because she is more likely to re the incompetent agent. However, an
increase in the accuracy of the low short-term performance measure causes the incompetent agent
to increase his manipulation e¤ort, and the principal is less likely to re the incompetent agent,
which decreases her expected prots. The rst e¤ect dominates with a less accurate low short-
term performance measure, and the second e¤ect dominates with a more accurate low short-term
performance measure. Together this implies that the principals expected prots are hump-shaped
in the accuracy of the low short-term performance measure.
The results about the value of ignoring short-term performance with manipulation imply that
the informativeness of the short-term performance measure has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the total
costs of the ring and retention errors. Specically, the accuracy of the low short-term performance
measure only a¤ects the cost of mistakenly retaining an incompetent agent, and the accuracy of
the high short-term performance measure only a¤ects the cost of mistakenly ring the competent
agent. Given the agents manipulation, a more informative high signal can increase or decrease the
cost of the ring error, and a more informative low signal can increase or decrease the cost of the
retention error.
The principal can take measures to increase the cost of an agents manipulation, e.g., through
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tighter internal controls. A higher manipulation cost reduces the agents manipulation e¤ort, but
the e¤ect on the principals expected prots depends on the informativeness of the short-term
performance measure. Less manipulation on the part of the competent agent is costly to the
principal because she is more likely to incur the cost of a ring error. In contrast, less manipulation
on the part of the incompetent agent is benecial to the principal because of a lower cost of the
retention error. Which of these e¤ects dominates depends on the informativeness of the short-
term performance measure. With a less informative short-term performance measure, the increase
in the ring cost dominates the reduction in the retention cost. This is because the competent
agents manipulation is especially important due to less ine¢ cient ring, and the decrease in the
incompetent agents manipulation has a small impact.
This paper is related to work that studies whether short-term performance should be measured.
Gigler, et al. (2014) study a managers incentive to focus on short-term performance that improves
market prices at the expense of the rms long-term performance. Hofmann and Rothenberg
(2014) study the e¤ect of private information on the production and dissemination of an interim
performance measure, and show that the owner prefers not to measure interim performance when
it is too forward-looking, which increases the cost of e¤ort incentives for the downstream manager.
This paper also shows that a rm owner may prefer not to measure short-term performance because
of the impact of measurement error and manipulation on the costs of ring and retention errors.
The results contribute to prior work on the e¤ect of performance measurement quality on
manipulation. For example, Bertomeu et al. (2017) show how a conservatively biased performance
measure increases manipulation, when the performance measure is used to motivate and reward the
agent. Caskey and Laux (2017) also show how a conservatively biased signal increases manipulation,
but consider a setting where the principal (i.e., the board) makes an investment decision. Relatedly,
Feltham and Xie (1994) considers performance measure and incentive e¤ects when an agent can
engage in window-dressing activities; however, in their setting, manipulation is always costly to the
principal. This paper highlights the benets and the costs of performance measure manipulation,
as well as the impact of measurement error in a principals decision of whether to re an agent, but
considers that the principal may wish to ignore the performance measure.
Prior work has also studied how accuracy and bias of the performance measure a¤ects decision-
making, but without considering manipulation. Gao and Wagenhofer (2013) study how bias a¤ects
a principals decision to monitor and to re or retain an agent. Balakrishnan, et al. (2019) study
how performance measure bias a¤ects the use of the performance measure for both the provision of
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productive incentives and for a ring decision. This paper also studies how bias and measurement
error a¤ects a principals choice of ring an agent, but considers an agents manipulation, and shows
that it may be optimal to forego the use of the performance measure.
2 Model
A risk neutral principal of a rm contracts with a risk neutral agent with limited liability to
provide costly productive e¤ort that impacts the rms actual, but unobservable, long-term value.
The rms long-term value is denoted x, and can be good or bad, i.e., x 2 fxg; xbg, and, without
loss of generality, I assume that xg > 0 and xb = 0. I also assume that the principal benets from
good long-term rm value, and that xg is su¢ ciently large so that the principal prefers to hire
an agent rather than to never hire an agent. Whether the rms long-term value is good or bad
depends on the agents productive e¤ort and t with the rm. At the time of contracting, neither
the principal nor the agent knows whether the agent is competent or incompetent at the rms
productive task. Denote the competent agent as AC and the incompetent agent as AI , where the
common prior belief that an agent is competent is Pr(AC) = .
After joining the rm, the agent learns whether he is competent or incompetent at the rms
productive task. I assume that any report by the agent to the principal about his type is not
contractible, i.e., it is unveriable. After contracting and learning his type, the agent privately
chooses productive e¤ort, denoted e, where e 2 feH ; eLg, with a cost of c(e), where c(eH) = c > 0,
and c(eL) = 0. If the agent is competent, the rms actual, but unobservable, long-term value is
good if he provides high e¤ort, and can be good or bad if he provides low e¤ort. If the agent is
incompetent, the rms long-term value is bad regardless of his e¤ort.4 Specically, the likelihood
of good long-term value depends on the competent agents e¤ort as follows,
Pr(xgjeH ;AC) = 1;Pr(xgjeL;AC) = q, where q 2 (0; 1). (1)
For an incompetent agent, the likelihood of good long-term performance is zero regardless of e¤ort,
or,
Pr(xgjeH ;AI) = Pr(xgjeL;AI) = 0. (2)
The principals contract with the agent species whether or not short-term performance will
4This is similar to the setting in Mailath and Samuelson (2001), but I do not focus on reputation e¤ects over
multiple periods.
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be measured and used in the decision of whether to re or retain the agent. The short-term
performance measure is denoted y, and can be high or low, i.e., y 2 fyh; y`g: If it is produced, it is
publicly observed after the agent provides e¤ort, and is an imperfect forecast of the rms long-term
value. The accuracy of the short-term performance measure about long-term performance is,
Pr(yhjxg) = g 2 (0; 1); and Pr(y`jxb) = b 2 (0; 1). (3)
The short-term performance measure is informative about long-term value, which implies,
Pr(yhjxg) > Pr(y`jxg); and Pr(y`jxb) > Pr(yhjxg); or,
g + b   1 > 0. (4)
With the short-term performance measure, I focus on a typical ring rule, which is to re
the agent if short-term performance is low, i.e., if y` is observed. If the principal res the agent,
then she loses the value of the agents productive e¤ort, x, but receives continuation prots  2
(0; xg). These continuation prots can be from hiring another agent of an unknown type to provide
productive e¤ort, or shutting down the rm and liquidating the rms assets.5 Without a short-
term performance measure, the agents production is su¢ ciently benecial (even with low e¤ort)
so that the principal prefers to always retain the agent.
Either type of agent has a benet, , if he is retained. This means that either type of agent has
an incentive to stay on the job, and if red, the loss of this benet is similar to a cost that would
reduce his outside option, i.e., the transaction costs of nding a new job, or a reputation cost from
being red for low performance.
In addition to productive e¤ort, either type of agent may also engage in costly, non-productive
e¤ort to manipulate the short-term performance measure. The agents manipulation e¤ort is de-
noted m, with m 2 [0; 1], and the cost to agent is 2m2, where  > 0. The agents manipulation
only a¤ects the reported high short-term performance, and has no e¤ect on the rms long-term
value. With probability m, the agents manipulation is successful and the short-term performance
measure is high, but if the agents manipulation is unsuccessful, the likelihood of a mistaken high
short-term performance measure depends on the error in the short-term performance measure.
5 I do not explicitly model a second period in which an agent (either the incumbent or newly hired) provides
productive e¤ort. However, the assumption that the principal loses the value of the agents productive e¤ort when
she res the agent is consistent with the idea of rm-specic human capital, which the rm and the worker both lose
upon worker separation from the rm.
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For the competent agent, manipulation e¤ort is denoted mCH with high productive e¤ort. The
likelihood that the agents short-term performance measure is high with high e¤ort is,
Pr(yhjeH ;AC) = mCH + g(1 mCH). (5)
With low productive e¤ort, the competent agents manipulation e¤ort is denoted mCL . Then, the
likelihood that the competent agents short-term performance measure is high with low e¤ort is,
Pr(yhjeL;AC) = q[mCL + g(1 mCL )] + (1  q)[mCL + (1  b)(1 mCL )]. (6)
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the short-term performance measure and long-term per-
formance, depending on the competent agents productive e¤ort and manipulation e¤ort.
Insert Figure 2
For an incompetent agent, manipulation e¤ort is denoted mI , and the likelihood that the
incompetent agents short-term performance measure is high is,
Pr(yhje;AI) = mI + (1  b)(1 mI): (7)
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the short-term performance measure and long-term per-
formance, given the incompetent agents productive e¤ort and manipulation e¤ort.
Insert Figure 3
Overall, the updated belief that long-term value is good, given the high short-term performance
measure, and assuming the competent agent works hard, is,
Pr(xgjyh) = [m
C
H + g(1 mCH)]
[mCH + g(1 mCH)] + (1  )[mI + (1  b)(1 mI)]
. (8)
The updated belief that long-term performance is bad, given the low short-term performance mea-
sure is,
Pr(xbjy`) = (1  )b(1 m
I)
(1  g)(1 mCH) + (1  )b(1 mI)
. (9)
Given the agents manipulation, these posterior beliefs about long-term value, i.e., Pr(xgjyh) and
Pr(xbjy`), are increasing in the informativeness of the short-term performance measure, g and b.
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The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The principal o¤ers a contract to the agent, who can accept or reject the contract; neither
party knows whether the agent is competent or incompetent. If the agent rejects the contract,
the game ends. The contract species whether a short-term performance measure, y, will be
produced, and if so, how it will be used in the ring decision.
2. If the agent accepts the contract and joins the rm, he privately learns whether he is competent
or incompetent.
3. The agent privately chooses productive e¤ort, e, and manipulation e¤ort, m.
4. If the contract specied that short-term performance measure is produced, then it is publicly
observed, and the agent is red if performance is low, y`. If the agent is red, the principal
earns continuation prots .
5. Without a short-term performance measure, the agent is not red.
I focus on a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, in which the principal o¤ers a contract that maximizes
her expected prots, UP , by choosing whether or not to measure short-term performance and to
re the agent if it is low, given her prior beliefs about the agents type, , the agents choice of
productive e¤ort, e, and manipulation e¤ort, m.6 An agent of unknown type must be willing to
join the rm, which means that his expected payo¤ from joining the rm, UA, is at least as large
as his reservation wage, which is normalized to zero. After the agent joins the rm, he maximizes
his expected payo¤ given his private information about his type by choosing productive e¤ort, e,
and the amount of manipulation e¤ort, m.
3 Benchmark-No Manipulation
In this section, I consider a benchmark setting, where the cost of manipulation is su¢ ciently
high ( = 1), so that neither type of agent engages in manipulation when the principal uses the
short-term performance measure for a ring decision, i.e., mC = mI = 0. However, the short-term
performance measure is still subject to error.
3.1 Value of Ignoring Short-Term Performance
I start with the case where the principal does not measure short-term performance and does
not the re the agent. Because the principal only uses the short-term performance measure to
6The assumption that the principal does not pay the agent a wage simplies the analysis, and the results are
qualitatively the same if a wage is determined endogenously.
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make a ring decision, not measuring short-term performance is equivalent to measuring short-
term performance and committing to ignore it. I rst determine each type of agents incentive to
provide productive e¤ort, and then consider the agents choice of whether to join the rm.
Without a short-term performance measure, the principal commits to never re the agent and
both types of agent receives the benet of being employed, . In this case, the competent agent
has no incentive to provide high e¤ort, and, thus, only provides low e¤ort. This is because he is
never red and always receives  regardless of e¤ort, and high e¤ort is costly. Ex ante, an agent
of unknown type is willing to join the rm because he will receive  > 0, which is greater than his
reservation wage of zero.
The following lemma summarizes the contract without a short-term performance measure, and
species the agents expected payo¤and the principals expected prots. All proofs are in Appendix
A.
Lemma 1 Without a short-term performance measure, both types of agents supply low productive
e¤ort, and neither type is red. The agents expected payo¤ depending on his type is,
U(AC)NoF = U(AI)NoF = . (10)
The principals expected prots are,
UPNoF = qxg. (11)
The principal prefers to hire an agent and never re the agent rather than to always re the agent
if UPNoF  , or if,
xg  
q
: (12)
Without a short-term performance measure, the principal only benets from good long-term
rm value when she hires a competent agent. Because the competent agent only provides low e¤ort,
long-term value is good with probability q < 1. With an incompetent agent, the rms long-term
value is always bad, which yields zero benet to the principal.
Next, I turn to the case where the principal uses the short-term performance measure to make
a ring decision. It is useful to start by considering all of the principals ring strategies with a
short-term performance measure: (i) she can hire an agent and always re the agent; (ii) she can
re the agent after observing a low short-term performance measure; (iii) she can re the agent
after observing a high short-term performance measure. I rule out the rst strategy by assuming
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that good long-term value, i.e., xg, is su¢ ciently high. With the third strategy, the principals
expected prots are always lower than the expected prots with no ring (which is equivalent to
no short-term performance measure).7 That leaves one possible ring strategy, which is a typical
ring rule, i.e., re the agent after observing low short-term performance.
When the principal uses the short-term performance measure to re the agent after observing
low performance, the cost of high e¤ort must be low relative to the benet of being employed to
motivate the competent agent to work hard. Specically, without manipulation, the competent
agent will prefer to work hard if,
g   c  [qg + (1  q)(1  b)]. (13)
Rearranging, this is,
c  (g + b   1)(1  q). (14)
In the following analysis, I assume that c is su¢ ciently low so that the inequality in (14) holds.
Then, with the competent agents high productive e¤ort, the rms long-term value is always good,
i.e., Pr(xgjeH ;AC) = 1. However, the competent agent is red when the performance measure
mistakenly reports low performance, which occurs with probability 1  g.
Just like without a short-term performance measure, the incompetent agent supplies low pro-
ductive e¤ort, and the rms long-term value is always bad, which yields a zero benet to the
principal. However, with the short-term performance measure and no manipulation, the incompe-
tent agent is red when the performance measure correctly reports low performance, which occurs
with probability b.
Finally, an agent of unknown type is willing to join the rm because his expected payo¤ is
always greater than his reservation wage of zero, or,
(g   c) + (1  )(1  b) > 0. (15)
The following lemma summarizes the setting with a short-term performance measure and ring
after observing y
`
.
Lemma 2 With a short-term performance measure and no manipulation, the competent agent
provides high productive e¤ort, and is red if the performance measure mistakenly reports low
7See the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A for details.
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performance. The incompetent agent provides low productive e¤ort and is red if the short-term
performance measure correctly reports low performance. The agents expected payo¤ depending on
his type is,
U(AC)FNoM = g   c. (16)
U(AI)FNoM = (1  b). (17)
The principals expected prots are,
UPFNoM = [gxg + (1  g)] + (1  )b. (18)
With no manipulation, the principal prefers to re the agent after observing y
`
than to always re
the agent if,
xg  [g + (1  )(1  b)]
g
<

q
. (19)
With the short-term performance measure, either type of agent may be red or retained because
of the measurement error. Because the competent agent is motivated to provide high e¤ort, the
rms long-term value is good if the principal hires a competent agent and retains the agent, which,
with no manipulation, occurs with probability g. The principal earns continuation prots, ,
when she res either type of agent. Note that if the principal prefers no short-term performance
measure and no ring to always ring the agent, i.e., if (12) holds, then the principal also prefers
the short-term performance measure and to re the agent after y
`
than to always re the agent.
Before determining the principals preference for whether to use the short-term performance
measure, the following states the e¤ect of the measurement error on the principals expected prots
with no manipulation.
Observation 1 With no manipulation, the principals expected prots with the short-term per-
formance measure and ring after observing y
`
are increasing in the accuracy of the short-term
performance measure, i.e., @U
PFNoM
@g
> 0, and @U
PFNoM
@b
> 0.
An increase in the accuracy of the short-term performance measure with no manipulation has
two e¤ects, both of which are benecial to the principal. First, an increase in g means that the
competent agents short-term performance measure is more likely to be high, and the principal is
less likely to re the competent agent. This increases the principals expected prots, because the
competent agents high productive e¤ort yields good long-term rm value, which is more benecial
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to the principal than the continuation prots she earns from ring the competent agent, i.e., xg > .
Second, an increase in b means that the incompetent agents short-term performance measure is
more likely to be low, and the principal is more likely to re the incompetent agent. This also
increases the principals expected prots because the incompetent agents productive e¤ort yields
bad long-term rm value, which has a zero benet to the principal, and which is less than the
continuation prots from ring the incompetent agent, .
I now turn to the principals preference for not producing a short-term performance measure
versus using a short-term performance measure without manipulation, by comparing the principals
expected prots in Lemma 1 to her expected prots in Lemma 2. The following proposition states
the principals preference.
Proposition 1 With no manipulation and with xg  q , the principal prefers no short-term per-
formance measure and no ring if q > 1   b (xg )xg and g 2 (1   b; 
NoM
g ]. Otherwise, the
principal prefers the short-term performance measure and ring after low short-term performance.
The threshold, 
NoM
, is given by,

NoM
g =
(qxg   )  (1  )b
(xg   ) . (20)
Comparing the principals expected prots, one di¤erence is the impact of the competent agents
productive e¤ort. Without a short-term performance measure, the competent agent does not
work hard, but with the short-term performance measure, the competent agent works hard. This
implies that the likelihood of good long-term rm value is lower without the short-term performance
measure, i.e., q < 1. Then, for the principal to prefer no short-term performance, the likelihood
of good long-term rm value with low e¤ort, i.e., q, must be su¢ ciently large. Specically, if
productivity with low e¤ort is low, or q  1   b (xg )xg , then the threshold is infeasible, or

NoM
g < 1  b, and the principal always prefers the short-term performance measure.
Even if the competent agents productivity with low e¤ort is su¢ ciently large, the principal will
only prefer to ignore short-term performance when the accuracy of the high short-term performance
measure about good long-term rm value is low, i.e., when g is low. With a less accurate high
short-term performance measure, the principal is more likely to re the competent agent because
the short-term performance measure mistakenly reports his performance as low.
The following observation is about the e¤ect of the accuracy of the low performance measure
about bad long-term value, i.e., b, on the principals preference.
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Observation 2 The threshold, NoMg , is decreasing in the accuracy of the low short-term
performance measure, b.
With a more accurate low short-term performance measure, the principal is more likely to re
the incompetent agent, which increases the principals expected prots. The results in Proposition
1 and Observation 2 suggest that, without manipulation, the overall informativeness of the short-
term performance measure, g and b, drives the principals preference for whether or not to use the
performance measure. The value of ignoring short-term performance arises with a less informative
performance measure.
Figure 3 shows the principals expected prots both with and without the short-term perfor-
mance measure and no manipulation, as a function of the accuracy of the short-term performance
measure, g (in Panel A) and b (in Panel B).
Insert Figure 3
3.2 Firing and Retention Errors
In this section, I discuss the ring and retention errors that arise both with and without the
short-term performance measure, when there is no manipulation. The most e¢ cient ring decision
is to re the agent when his productivity leads to bad long-term rm value, and the most e¢ cient
retention decision is to retain the agent when his productivity leads to good long-term rm value.
Whether the principal makes a ring or a retention error depends on whether or not she uses the
short-term performance measure to re the agent when the agents performance is low.
With an imperfect short-term performance measure, the competent agent works hard, which
always leads to good long-term rm value. In this case, the principal sometimes makes a ring error,
because she res the competent agent when his short-term performance is low. The incompetent
agents production always leads to bad long-term rm value, implying that the principal sometimes
makes a retention error by retaining the incompetent agent when his short-term performance is
high.
Without a short-term performance measure and without ring, the competent agent does not
work hard, and the rms long-term value may be good or bad. Without ring, the principal always
retains the agent. This means that the principal never makes a ring error, but sometimes makes a
retention error with the competent agent, and always makes a retention error with the incompetent
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agent. These ring and retention errors are costly to the principal because of foregone prots.
Table 1 summarizes the expected costs of the ring and retention errors with no manipulation.
No Short-Term Performance Measure Short-Term Performance Measure
Firing Error 0 (1  g)(xg   )
Retention Error [(1  q) + (1  )] (1  )(1  b)
Table 1: Expected Costs of the Firing and Retention Errors With No Manipulation
The ring error with the short-term performance measure is costly to the principal because
of the foregone prots: when she res the competent agent, she receives the continuation prots
of , but loses the benet of good long-term rm value, xg. The retention error is also costly to
the principal because when she retains an incompetent agent she does not receive a benet from
long-term rm value, and gives up the continuation prots, . The following is an observation
about the e¤ect of the informativeness of the short-term performance measure on the ring and
retention costs.
Observation 3 .With no manipulation, an increase in the accuracy of the high short-term
performance measure, i.e., g, reduces the cost of the ring error, and an increase in the accuracy
of the low short-term performance measure, i.e., b, reduces the cost of the retention error.
Comparing the cost of the errors, with no manipulation, the cost of the retention error is higher
without a short-term performance measure and without ring. Without a short-term performance
measure, the principal always retains the incompetent agent, while with the short-term performance
measure, the principal sometimes correctly res the incompetent agent. In addition, without a
short-term performance measure, the principal retains the competent agent when his production
leads to bad long-term rm value. Thus, with no manipulation, an important benet of the short-
term performance measure is correctly ring the incompetent agent. However, the cost of the
short-term performance measure is mistakenly ring the competent agent when his production
leads to good long-term rm value.
4 Short-Term Performance Manipulation
In this section, in addition to measurement error, the agents cost of manipulation is not too
high, or  <1, and both types of agents can engage in manipulation of the short-term performance
measure.
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4.1 Value of Ignoring Short-Term Performance
I consider the principals preference for whether or not to use the short-term performance
measure for ring the agent when the agent can manipulate the performance measure. Similar
to the benchmark section, I focus on the principals strategy of ring the agent after observing
low short-term performance. I also continue to assume that the benet to the principal of good
long-term rm value, i.e., xg, is su¢ ciently high, so that the principal does not always want to re
the agent.
With the short-term performance measure, I determine each type of agents incentive to provide
productive e¤ort, and the optimal manipulation e¤ort. Then, I consider the agents choice of
whether to join the rm. The competent agent can tailor his manipulation e¤ort to his productive
e¤ort, and will prefer to work hard rather than not work hard if,
[mCH + g(1 mCH)]   c 

2
(mCH)
2
 fq[mCL + g(1 mCL )] + (1  q)[mCL + (1  b)(1 mCL )]g  

2
(mCL )
2. (21)
Given the competent agents manipulation, the cost of e¤ort must be su¢ ciently low so that the
competent agent prefers to work hard with the short-term performance measure.
The competent agent solves the following to determine the optimal amount of manipulation,
depending on his productive e¤ort:
mCH 2 argmax[mCH + g(1 mCH)]   c 

2
(mCH)
2; (22)
mCL 2 argmaxfq[mCL + g(1 mCL )]
+(1  q)[mCL + (1  b)(1 mCL )]g  

2
(mCL )
2. (23)
The solution is,
mCH =
8<:
(1 g)
 if

 > (1  g)
1 if   (1  g)
(24)
mCL =
8<:
[q(1 g)+(1 q)b]
 , if

 > [q(1  g) + (1  q)b]
1, if   [q(1  g) + (1  q)b]
(25)
If the cost of manipulation is su¢ ciently low relative to the agents benet of being employed,
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i.e., if   (1   g) < [q(1   g) + (1   q)b], then manipulation is perfect regardless of e¤ort,
or mCH = m
C
L = 1, and the principal cannot motivate the competent agent to work hard. This
is because with perfect manipulation the competent agent is never red, which means he always
receives the benet of being employed, , he incurs the cost of manipulation of 2 regardless of
e¤ort, and low productive e¤ort is less costly than high e¤ort. For a higher manipulation cost-
benet ratio, i.e.,  > (1  g), then manipulation is imperfect, or mCH < 1, and the principal can
motivate the competent agent to provide high productive e¤ort as long as the cost of high e¤ort,
c, is su¢ ciently low.
The incompetent agents productive e¤ort always leads to bad long-term rm value, which yields
zero benet to the principal. However, because the agent wants to retain his job and earn the benet,
, he has an incentive to manipulate the performance measure. Specically, the incompetent agent
solves the following to determine the optimal amount of manipulation:
mI 2 argmax[mI + (1  b)(1 mI)]   
2
(mI)2. (26)
The solution is,
mI =
8<:
b
 if

 > b
1 if   b
The incompetent agents optimal interior level of manipulation is always higher than the com-
petent agents optimal interior level of manipulation. If the manipulation cost-benet ratio is
su¢ ciently low, i.e., if   b, and mI = 1, then there is no contract that involves ring the agent
after observing a low short-term performance measure. This is because the incompetent agents
short-term performance is always high, and low short-term performance indicates that the agent is
competent, and the principal would not re the competent agent.
Finally, ex ante, an agent of unknown type will join the rm if his expected payo¤ is greater
than the reservation wage of zero. When the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio is low, i.e.,

  b, the principal never res the agent, and each type of agent always receives  > 0, which is
more than the agents reservation wage. When the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio is not
low, i.e.,  > b, the competent agent will work hard, and each type of agents manipulation e¤ort
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is interior. Then an agent of unknown type will join the rm if,
f[mCH + g(1 mCH)]   c 

2
m2Hg
+(1  )f[mI + (1  b)(1 mI)]   
2
m2Ig  0. (27)
Because the cost of high e¤ort, c; must be su¢ ciently low to motivate the competent agent to
work hard, i.e., the inequality in (21) holds, and because the incompetent agents expected payo¤
is positive, then the inequality in (27) always holds.
The following lemma summarizes the contract with a short-term performance measure with
manipulation and ring after observing y`, and species the agents expected payo¤ depending on
his type, and the principals expected prots.
Lemma 3 With a short-term performance measure and manipulation, if the agents manipulation
cost-benet ratio is low, or   b, then both types of agents provide low productive e¤ort, and nei-
ther type of agent is red. If the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio is high, or  > b, then the
competent agent provides high productive e¤ort, and is red if his manipulation is unsuccessful and
if the performance measure mistakenly reports low performance. The incompetent agent provides
low productive e¤ort and is red if his manipulation is unsuccessful and the short-term performance
measure correctly reports low performance. The agents expected payo¤ depending on his type is,
U(AC)F = U(AI)F = , if


 b; (28)
U(AC)F = [mCH + g(1 mCH )]   c 

2
(mCH )
2 if


> b. (29)
U(AI)F = [mI + (1  b)(1 mI)]   
2
(mI)2 if


> b. (30)
The principals expected prots are,
UPF =
8>>><>>>:
qxg, if   b;
f[mCH + g(1 mCH )]xg + (1  g)(1 mCH )]g
+(1  )b(1 mI), if  > b.
With manipulation, the principal prefers to re the agent after observing y
`
than to always re the
agent if,
xg  

1 +
(1  )[(1  b) + bmI]
[g + (1  g)mCH ]

.
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When the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio is low, i.e.,   b, the principal never res the
agent, and the competent agent provides low e¤ort, implying that long-term rm value is good with
probability q. With the incompetent agent, the rms long-term value is always bad, which yields
zero benet to the principal. When the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio is is not low, i.e.,

 > b, the competent agent provides high e¤ort, and long-term rm value is always good. However,
the principal res the competent agent when his manipulation is unsuccessful and the performance
measure mistakenly reports low performance, which occurs with probability (1   g)(1   mCH ).
The principal also res the incompetent agent when his manipulation is unsuccessful and the
performance measure correctly reports low performance, which occurs with probability b(1 mI).
Before determining the principals preference to ignore short-term performance, I rst assess
the e¤ect of the measurement error on the principals expected prots with manipulation.
Proposition 2 With manipulation, and with the short-term performance measure and ring after
y
`
, the principals expected prots can be decreasing, increasing, or independent of the informa-
tiveness of the performance measure, depending on the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio.
Specically,
i. If


 b, then @U
PF
@g
=
@UPF
@b
= 0.
ii. If b <


< 2(1  g), then @U
PF
@g
< 0, and if


 2(1  g), then @U
PF
@g
 0.
iii. If b <


< 2b, then
@UPF
@b
< 0, and if


 2b, then @U
PF
@b
 0.
Compared to the benchmark case without manipulation, the e¤ect of the informativeness of
the short-term performance measure on the principals expected prots di¤ers signicantly, and
depends on the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio. When this cost-benet ratio is very low,
i.e.,   b, then the principal never res the agent, both types of agents provide low e¤ort, and
neither type of agent manipulates the performance measure. In this case, because the principal
never res the agent, the performance measurement error has no e¤ect on the principals expected
prots.
When the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio is not low, i.e.,  > b, then the competent
agent provides high e¤ort, and each agents manipulation is imperfect, implying that the per-
formance measurement error has an e¤ect on the principals expected prots. The e¤ect of an
increase in the accuracy of the performance measure on the principals expected prots depends on
19
whether the accuracy of the high or low short-term performance measure increases, and the agents
manipulation cost-benet ratio.
An increase in the accuracy of the high short-term performance measure, g, has two opposing
e¤ects. When the competent agents manipulation is unsuccessful, an increase in g means that
the principal is less likely to re the competent agent, which increases the principals expected
prots. However, an increase in g also causes the competent agents optimal manipulation e¤ort,
mCH , to decrease. This latter e¤ect means that the principal is more likely to re the competent
agent because the agents manipulation is less likely to be successful, which decreases the principals
expected prots. Which e¤ect dominates depends on the level of the accuracy of the high short-term
performance measure, g, relative the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio,  . When this cost-
benet ratio is low, or when the high short-term performance measure is less accurate, i.e., when

 < 2(1 g), then the e¤ect on the agents manipulation dominates, and the principals expected
prots are decreasing in g. Otherwise, the former e¤ect dominates, and the principals expected
prots are increasing in g. Together, this means that for a given manipulation cost-benet ratio,

 , the principals expected prots are U-shaped in the accuracy of the high short-term performance
measure, g.
An increase in the accuracy of the low short-term performance measure, b, also has two oppos-
ing e¤ects. When the incompetent agents manipulation is unsuccessful, an increase in b means
that the principal is more likely to re the agent, which increases the principals expected prots.
However, an increase in b also causes the incompetent agents manipulation e¤ort,mI, to increase,
which means the incompetent agents manipulation is more likely to be successful, which decreases
the principals expected prots. Similar to the case with the competent agent, which e¤ect domi-
nates depends on the level of the accuracy of the low short-term performance measure, b, relative
the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio,  . If this cost-benet ratio is low, or the low short-term
performance measure is more accurate, i.e.,  < 2b, then the e¤ect on the agents manipulation
dominates, and the principals expected prots are decreasing in b. Otherwise, the former e¤ect
dominates, and the principals expected prots are increasing in b. Together, this means that for
a given manipulation cost-benet ratio,  , the principals expected prots are hump-shaped in the
accuracy of the low short-term performance measure, b.
I now turn to the principals preference for using a short-term performance measure and ring
the agent when his performance is low, or not producing a short-term performance measure, by
comparing the principals expected prots in Lemma 1 to her expected prots in Lemma 3. The fol-
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lowing proposition establishes the principals preference with measurement error and manipulation,
where the thresholds, g, g, q, and q are dened in Appendix A.
Proposition 3 With manipulation and with xg  q , the principal prefers no short-term per-
formance measure if b <   2b, q < q < q, and g 2 [g; g], or if  > b, q > q and
g 2 (1   b; g]. If   b, then the principal is indi¤erent between using the short-term perfor-
mance measure to re the agent after low performance and no short-term performance measure.
Otherwise, the principal prefers the short-term performance measure and ring after low perfor-
mance.
Compared to the benchmark case without manipulation, one similarity in the principals pref-
erence for no short-term performance measure is that the competent agents productivity with low
e¤ort, i.e., q, must be su¢ ciently large, or q > q for the principal to prefer no short-term perfor-
mance measure. However, the principal is indi¤erent if the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio
is very low, because the principal never res the agent, and neither type of agent provides high
productive e¤ort. When the cost-benet ratio is not low, the agents manipulation has a signi-
cant impact on the principals preference, via the e¤ect of the informativeness of the short-term
performance measure.
From Proposition 2, for a given manipulation cost-benet ratio that is not low, i.e.,  > b, the
principals expected prots with the short-term performance are decreasing in g when g is small,
and increasing in g when g is large, i.e., U-shaped in g. When the high short-term performance
measure is not very accurate, the competent agents manipulation is more likely to be successful,
which is benecial to the principal, because she is less likely to re the competent agent. In contrast,
when the high performance measure is more accurate, the principal is less likely to re the agent
when his manipulation is unsuccessful, which is benecial to the principal. The non-monotonic
e¤ect of the accuracy of the high short-term performance measure on the principals expected
prots implies that the principal will prefer no short-term performance measure for intermediate
levels of the accuracy of the high short-term performance, i.e., for g 2 [g; g]. Note that this
result also holds when there is no bias, i.e., when g = b.8
The smaller threshold is only feasible (i.e., g > 1  b) when the competent agents productivity
with low e¤ort is not too large, i.e., q < q, and if the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio is
not too large, i.e.,   2b. In the former case, if the competent agents productivity with low
8See Appendix B for an analysis without performance measurement bias.
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e¤ort is large, q  q, then, similar to the benchmark case, the principals expected prots without
a short-term performance measure are higher than with the short-term performance measure as
long as g < g. Even if the competent agents productivity with low e¤ort is not too large, if
the accuracy of the low short-term performance measure is su¢ ciently small, i.e., b < 2 , then,
similar the benchmark case, the principal prefers no short-term measure when g < g.
Next, I analyze the e¤ect of an increase in the accuracy of the low short-term performance
measure, b, on the principals preference for whether or not to use the short-term performance
measure, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 An increase in b causes the smaller threshold, g, to decrease, and causes the larger
threshold, g, to increase if   2b, and to decrease if  > 2b.
When both thresholds for g in Proposition 3 are feasible, then an increase in the accuracy of
the low short-term performance measure implies that the principal is more likely to prefer no short-
term performance measure, i.e., the smaller threshold, g, decreases, and the larger threshold, g,
increases. This is because the agents manipulation cost-benet is low relative to the accuracy of the
low short-term performance measure, and from Proposition 2, in this case, the principals expected
prots are decreasing in b. However, when only the larger threshold for g in Proposition 3 is
feasible, then an increase in the accuracy of the low short-term performance measure implies that
the principal is more likely to prefer the short-term performance measure, i.e., the larger threshold,
g, decreases, which is similar to the benchmark case without manipulation. This is because the
agents manipulation cost-benet is high relative to the accuracy of the low short-term performance
measure, and from Proposition 2, in this case, the principals expected prots are increasing in b.
Figure 4 shows the principals preference for short-term performance measurement as a function
of the accuracy of the performance measure, g (Panel A), and b (Panel B). Panel A of Figure 4
demonstrates the e¤ect of an increase in the accuracy of the high short-term performance measure
(g) on the principals expected prots, which, from Proposition 2, is U-shaped. It also illustrates
the results from Proposition 3, when the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio is not too large
relative to the accuracy of the low performance measure, and the competent agents productivity
from low e¤ort is not too high. That is, the principal prefers to use the short-term performance
measure when the high short-term performance measure is either very inaccurate or very accurate.
Panel B of Figure 4 demonstrates the e¤ect of an increase in the accuracy of the low short-term
performance measure (b), which, from Proposition 2, is hump-shaped. The gure also demon-
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strates that, for a given level of accuracy of the high short-term performance measure, g, the
principal prefers to use the short-term performance measure for an intermediate level of the accu-
racy of the low short-term performance measure.
Insert Figure 4
4.2 Firing and Retention Errors
The costs of the ring and retention errors play an important role in the principals preference
for whether or not to produce and use a short-term performance measure. With no short-term
performance measure and no ring, the principal never incurs a cost for ring the competent
agent. In contrast, with a short-term performance measure, the principal res the competent agent,
depending on the extent of the measurement error in the high short-term performance measure,
i.e., g, and the agents manipulation e¤ort, mCH . In this case, the cost to the principal is the
foregone prots when long-term value is good less the continuation prots.
With the incompetent agent and no short-term performance measure, the principal always in-
curs a retention cost due to lost continuation prots. In contrast, with a short-term performance
measure, the principal only res the incompetent agent when his manipulation is unsuccessful and
the performance measure is correct. Thus, the principal incurs a retention cost that depends on
the agents manipulation, mI, as well as the measurement error of the low short-term perfor-
mance measure, b. Table 2 summarizes the expected costs of the ring and retention errors with
manipulation.
No Short-Term Performance Measure Short-Term Performance Measure
Firing Error 0 (1  g)(1 mCH )(xg   )
Retention Error [(1  q) + (1  )] (1  )(1  b + bmI)
Table 2: Expected Costs of the Firing and Retention Errors With Manipulation
The following corollary considers the e¤ect of the informativeness of the short-term performance
measure on the principals ring and retention costs.
Corollary 2 With manipulation, an increase in the accuracy of the high short-term performance
measure, g, decreases the cost of the ring error if  > 2(1   g), and otherwise increases the
cost of the ring error. An increase in the accuracy of the low short-term performance measure, b,
decreases the cost of the retention error if  > 2b, and otherwise increases the cost of the retention
error.
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The e¤ect of the informativeness of the short-term performance measure on the retention and
ring costs follows from the e¤ect of the performance measures informativeness on the principals
expected prots, as in Proposition 2. When the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio is high, or
the accuracy of the low short-term performance measure is low, i.e., if  > 2b, then an increase in
the accuracy of low short-term performance measure (b) increases the principals expected prots
because the agents manipulation is more likely to be unsuccessful, and the principal is less likely to
retain the incompetent agent. Similarly, when the agents manipulation cost-benet ratio is high,
or the accuracy of the high short-term performance measure is high, i.e., if  > 2(1   g), then
an increase in the accuracy of high short-term performance measure (g) increases the principals
expected prots because the principal is less likely to re the competent agent.
I turn next to the e¤ect of the agents cost of manipulation on the ring and retention errors.
Given the performance measurement error, the principal can take steps to increase the cost of the
agents manipulation, , e.g., by installing a stricter internal control system. With a higher cost
of manipulation, both types of agentsoptimal manipulation e¤ort decreases. However, whether or
not this is benecial to the principal depends on the impact on her ring and retention decisions,
as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 An increase in the agents cost of manipulation, , causes the total expected cost of
the ring and retention errors to increase if g 2 (1  b; 1  b
q
(1 )
(xg ) ); otherwise, an increase
in  causes the total expected cost of the ring and retention errors to decrease.
Because the competent agents manipulation is benecial to the principal, and the incompetent
agents manipulation is costly to the principal, less manipulation can lead to more or less e¢ cient
ring and retention. An increase in the cost of manipulation increases the cost of the ring error,
but has the opposite e¤ect on the cost of the retention error. For a given level of the informative-
ness of the performance measure, when the competent agents manipulation e¤ort decreases, the
principal is more likely to mistakenly re the competent agent, which is costly. However, when the
incompetent agents manipulation e¤ort decreases, the principal is less likely to mistakenly retain
the incompetent agent.
Whether an increase in the cost of manipulation causes the total cost of the errors to increase or
to decrease depends on the informativeness of the performance measure. When the informativeness
of the performance measure is low, i.e., either g or b is low, then the increase in the cost of
the ring error dominates the decrease in the cost of the retention error. This is because with
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an inaccurate high performance measure, the competent agents manipulation is more benecial
to the principal due to less ine¢ cient ring. When the low performance measure is inaccurate,
then the incompetent agents manipulation is less likely to be successful, and the decrease in the
incompetent agents manipulation has a small e¤ect.
Figure 5 illustrates the e¤ect of the agents cost of manipulation, , on the total cost of the
errors, both with and without a short-term performance measure, when g is low (Panel A) and
when g is high. Given the accuracy of the low short-term performance measure, b, Figure 5
clearly depicts the results in Corollary 4: when g is low (high), the cost of the total errors is
increasing (decreasing) in .
Furthermore, Figure 5 also depicts how the cost of the total errors with a short-term performance
measure compare to the cost of the total error without a short-term performance, which consists
only of the retention error. In Panel A, when the informativeness of the short-term performance
measure is low, the cost of the total errors with a short-term performance is only lower than without
a short-term performance measure, when the cost of manipulation is relatively low. In contrast, in
Panel B, when the informativeness of the short-term performance measure is high, the cost of the
total errors with a short-term performance is only lower than without a short-term performance
measure, when the cost of manipulation is relatively high.
Insert Figure 5
5 Conclusion
This paper studies how measurement error and an agents manipulation e¤ort a¤ect the value of
ignoring short-term performance, when it could be used for a ring decision. Performance measure
manipulation can either be benecial or costly to the principal, depending on the agents compe-
tence. This means that the e¤ect of the informativeness of the short-term performance measure
on the principals expected prots is non-monotonic. When the short-term performance measure
is less accurate about the competent agents performance, the competent agents manipulation is
benecial because it keeps the principal from making a ring error due to measurement error, but
when the short-term performance measure is more accurate, the competent agents manipulation
is not important. Thus, it is valuable to ignore short-term performance when it is neither accurate
nor inaccurate about the competent agents performance. An incompetent agents manipulation is
costly to the principal, and while a more accurate short-term performance measure helps to avoid
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costly retention errors, it also increases the incompetent agents manipulation. This means that
it may be more valuable to ignore short-term performance when it is more informative about the
incompetent agents performance.
The results also suggest that increasing the cost of the agents manipulation, e.g., by installing
a stricter internal control system, may have a negative impact, depending on the informativeness
of the performance measure. With a less informative performance measure, increasing the agents
manipulation cost increases the total cost of the ring and retention errors. In this case, the
benet of the competent agents manipulation is signicant, and it is more benecial to reduce the
manipulation cost and tolerate the incompetent agents manipulation.
The results have important implications for practice, and understanding how short-term per-
formance evaluation can be detrimental to a rms long-term value. Depending on the extent of
measurement error, and the cost of manipulation to the manager, the rm owner may wish to avoid
measuring short-term performance, even if it means retaining an incompetent manager.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1: Without a short-term performance measure and without ring, given the
agents benet of being retained, , the competent agent will not work hard because,
   c < . (31)
The incompetent agent also supplies low e¤ort. Then, the agents expected payo¤ depending on
his type is,
U(AC)NoF = U(AI)NoF = . (32)
With a reservation wage of zero, an agent of unknown type will join the rm for any   0. The
principals expected prots are,
UPNoF = qxg. (33)
The principal prefers to hire an agent and never re the agent rather than to always re the agent
if UPNoF  , or if,
xg  
q
. (34)

Proof of Lemma 2: With a short-term performance measure, ring after y` is observed, and no
manipulation, the competent agent will prefer to supply high e¤ort if,
g   c  [qg + (1  q)(1  b)], or,
c  (1  q)(g + b   1). (35)
In the analysis that follows, I assume that the competent agents cost of high e¤ort is not that
large so that the inequality in (35) always holds. The incompetent agent only supplies low e¤ort
and his long-term performance is always bad. With no manipulation, the incompetent agent is
retained with probability Pr(yhjeL; AI) = (1  b). Then, each agents expected payo¤ given his
type is,
U(AC)FNoM = g   c. (36)
U(AI)FNoM = (1  b). (37)
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An agent of unknown type is willing to join the rm if,
(g   c) + (1  )(1  b)  0. (38)
Because the inequality in (35) must hold, then the agents expected payo¤ in (38) is always
strictly positive.
The principal retains the competent agent when yh is observed, which occurs with probability
g. In this case, the agents long-term performance will be good, and the principal earns xg. She
also retains the incompetent agent when yh is observed, which occurs with probability
(1  )(1  b), but his long-term performance will be bad, which means the principal receives
xb = 0. When the principal res either agent, she earns continuation prots, . Putting this
altogether, the principals expected prots are,
UPFNoM = [gxg + (1  g)] + (1  )b. (39)
The principal prefers to re the agent after observing y` rather than to always re the agent if
UPFNoM  , or if
xg  [g + (1  )(1  b)]
g
. (40)
However,[g+(1 )(1 b)]g <

q for all g and b. 
Proof of Proposition 1: From above, with xg  q , the principal prefers no short-term
performance measure with no ring to always ring the agent. Next, I show that the principal
prefers no short-term performance measure with xg  q rather than to use the short-term
performance measure and re the agent after observing yh. With ring the agent after observing
yh, the competent agent will not work hard because, with b > 1  g, his expected payo¤ with
high e¤ort is always less than with low e¤ort, or,
(1  g)   c < [q(1  g) + (1  q)b]. (41)
The incompetent agent also supplies low e¤ort. Then, an agent of unknown type is willing to join
the rm if,
[q(1  g) + (1  q)b] + (1  )  0. (42)
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This inequality holds for any   0. The principals expected prots are,
UPH = fq(1  g)xg + [qg + (1  q)(1  b)]g+ (1  )(1  b). (43)
The principals expected prots are higher with no short-term performance measure, i.e.,
UNoF > UPH if,
xg >

q
f[qg + (1  q)(1  b)] + (1  )(1  b)g
g
. (44)
Because [qg + (1  q)(1  b)] + (1  )(1  b) < g and with xg  q , this is true.
Then, with no manipulation, the principal prefers no short-term performance measure with no
ring to the short-term performance measure and ring after observing y` if UPNoF  UPFNoM ,
or if,
qxg  [gxg + (1  g)] + (1  )b. (45)
Rearranging, this is
g  NoMg 
(qxg   )  (1  )b
(xg   ) . (46)
Note that by observation, 
NoM
g < 1, and (qxg   )  (1  )b > 0 because xg  q . The
threshold is feasible if 
NoM
g > 1  b, or if,
q > 1  b (xg   )
xg
. (47)
This condition on q is stronger than xg  q , which, rearranging, is q  xg . Then, the principal
prefers the short-term performance measure and ring after observing y` if q  (1  b) + bxg , or
if q > (1  b) + bxg and g > 
NoM
g . 
Proof of Lemma 3: With manipulation, the competent agents incentive constraint is,
[g + (1  g)mCH ]   c 

2
(mCH)
2 
fq[g + (1  g)mCL ] + (1  q)[(1  b) + bmCL ]g  

2
(mCL )
2. (48)
The competent agent solves the following to determine the optimal amount of manipulation
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depending on his productive e¤ort:
mCH 2 argmax[g + (1  g)mCH ]   c 

2
(mCH)
2. (49)
mCL 2 argmaxfq[g + (1  g)mCL ] + (1  q)[(1  b) + gmCL ]g  

2
(mCL )
2. (50)
The rst order condition for each possible manipulation e¤ort is,
mCH =
8<:
(1 g)
 if

 > (1  g)
1 if   (1  g)
(51)
mCL =
8<:
[q(1 g)+(1 q)b]
 if

 > q(1  g) + (1  q)b
1 if   q(1  g) + (1  q)b
(52)
If mCH =
(1 g)
 < 1, I assume that the competent agents cost of high e¤ort, c, is su¢ ciently
small so that he prefers to supply high e¤ort, i.e., c, is su¢ ciently small so that the inequality in
(48) holds.
The incompetent agent does not work hard, and solves the following to determine the optimal
amount of manipulation,
mI 2 argmax[(1  b) + bmI ]   
2
m2I . (53)
The rst order condition is,
mI =
8<:
b
 if

 > b
1 if   b
(54)
If   (1  g) < b, then mCH = mCLH = mI = 1. In this case, the competent agents
short-term performance is always high, and he is never red. Therefore, the competent agent has
no incentive to work hard because if he works hard, he receives    c  2 , and if he does not work
hard, he receives    2 . The incompetent agent is also never red because his short-term
performance is always high. Then, each type of agent receives    2 . For an agent of unknown
type to be willing to join the rm, then the agents benet of being employed must be su¢ ciently
high, i.e.,   2 , or   2. However with the cost of manipulation so low, i.e.,  < (1  g), this
is always true. When both types of agents supply low productive e¤ort, and their manipulation
e¤ort is perfect, the principal never res either agent, and her expected prots are the same as
with no short-term performance measure, i.e., as in (33).
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If (1  g) <   b, then then mCH = (1 g) < 1, mL is as above in (52), and mI = 1. From
above, with mCH < 1, and ring after observing y`, the competent agent prefers to work hard.
However, with mI = 1, the incompetent agent is never red because his short-term performance is
always high. This means that if y` is observed, the principal knows that the agent is competent
and will not re him. Thus, with mI = 1, there is no feasible contract that entails ring, implying
that neither agent will work hard, and the principals expected prots are the same as with no
short-term performance measure, i.e., as in (33).
If  > b, then m
C
H =
(1 g)
 < 1 and m

I =
b
 < 1. An agent of an unknown type is willing
to join the rm if,
f[g + (1  g)mCH ]   c 

2
(mCH )
2g
+(1  )f[(1  b) + bmI ]  

2
(mI)
2g  0 (55)
This inequality is always strictly positive because the competent agents incentive constraint in
(inequality in (48) holds, and with mI =
b
 , the incompetent agents expected payo¤ is
[(1  b) + bmI ]   2m2I > 0:The principals expected payo¤ is,
UPF = f[g + (1  g)mCH ]xg + (1  g)(1 mCH )]g
+(1  )b(1 mI). (56)
The principal prefers to re the agent after observing y` rather than to always re the agent if
UPF  , or,
xg  

1 +
(1  )[(1  b) + bmI ]
[g + (1  g)mH ]

(57)

Proof of Proposition 2: There are two parts to this proof.
1. Assume that   b, then mI = 1, and regardless of mCH , the principals expected prots are
UPF = qxg, and @U
PF
@g
= @U
PF
@b
= 0.
2. Assume that  > b, then m
C
H =
(1 g)
 < 1 and m

I =
b
 < 1. The principals expected
prots are increasing in g if,
@UPF
@g
= (xg   )(1  2mH) > 0. (58)
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Because xg    > 0, then this can only hold if mCH < 12 , or if  > 2(1  g). Note that this is only
feasible if 2(1  g)  b. Otherwise, @UPF@g  0.
The principals expected prots are increasing in b if,
@UPF
@b
= (1  )(1  2mI) > 0. (59)
This can only hold if mI <
1
2 , or if

 > 2b. Otherwise,
@UPF
@b
 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3: In the following, I compare the principals expected prots without a
short-term performance measure and with the short-term performance measure and ring after
observing y`, assuming xg  q . Using the short-term performance measure to re the agent after
observing yh is never optimal because neither type of agent will manipulate the performance
measure. Then, as shown above, the principal always prefers no short-term performance measure.
In addition, with xg  q , it is never optimal to always re the agent. There are two parts to this
proof.
1. Assume that   b, which means mI = 1. The principals expected prots with no short-term
performance measure are the same as with the short-term performance measure and ring after
observing y`, i.e., UPNoF = UPF = qxg.
2. Assume that  > b. Then, m
C
H =
(1 g)
 < 1 and m

I =
b
 < 1. The principal prefers no
short-term performance measure to using the short-term performance measure and ring after
observing y`, if UPNoF  UPF , or if
qxg  f[g + (1  g)mCH ]xg + (1  g)(1 mCH )]g+ (1  )b(1 mI). (60)
Substituting for mCH =
(1 g)
 and m

I =
b
 , and rearranging, this is
g(g)  2gA+ gB + C  0, where,
A = 


(xg   );
B =  (2

  1)(xg   );
C = [


(xg   )  (qxg   )] + (1  )b(1  b

).
The coe¢ cient on 2g is always positive, i.e., A > 0. However, with

 > b, then

 can be small,
and the signs of B and C depend on  .
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Assume rst that  >
1
2 , which means that B < 0. Also, assume that C > 0. Then, the
discriminant of g(g) is strictly positive if,
q > q  1  [(xg   )  (1  )
4
 b(1  b )]
 4 xg
. (61)
Note that with  >
1
2 , q < 1. With q > q and

 >
1
2 , there are two positive roots of g(g),
denoted g and g, whereg < g. Checking the feasibility of g, g < 1 if
p
B2   4AC < 2A+B.
The right-hand side of this inequality is positive, and rearranging yields
[(xg   )  (qxg   )] + (1  )b(1  b ) > 0, which is true. Furthermore, g > 1  b ifp
B2   4AC > 2A(1  b) +B, which is true if  > 12b . If

 <
1
2b
, then, this inequality holds if,
q > q  1  (xg   )b(1 
b
 )
xg
. (62)
Note that q > q. Next, g > 1  b if
p
B2   4AC <  B   2A(1  b). The right hand side of this
inequality is positive if  >
1
2b
. Then, rearranging yields q < q. With  >
1
2b
and q < q < q,
then 1  b < g < g < 1. Finally, C > 0 if,
q < bq  [ (xg   ) + ] + (1  )b(1  b )
xg
: (63)
With  >
1
2b
, then bq > q: Summarizing, if 12b <  < 1b and q < q < q, then the principal prefers
no short-term performance measurement if g 2 [g; g], and otherwise prefers the short-term
performance measure. If 12 <

 <
1
b
and if q > q, then the principal prefers no short-term
performance measurement if g 2 (1  b; g], and otherwise prefers the short-term performance
measure.
Next assume that  <
1
2 , which means that B > 0. Assume that C < 0, because otherwise
g(g) > 0 and the principal always prefers the short-term performance measure. With C < 0,
there is only one positive root, g, which, from above, is feasible if q > q (because  <
1
2b
).
Then, from above, C < 0 if q > bq. With  < 12 , then bq < q. Summarizing, with  < 12 , the
principal prefers no short-term performance measure if q > q and g 2 (1  b; g], and otherwise
prefers the short-term performance measure. 
Proof of Corollary 1: If b <   2b and q < q < q, then there are two feasible thresholds, g
and g. With A, B, and C as dened above, an increase in b causes the smaller threshold, g, to
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decrease if,
@g
@b
=
(1  )(1  2b )p
B2   4AC  0, (64)
which is true with   2b. An increase in b causes the larger threshold, g, to increase if,
@g
@b
=  (1  )(1 
2b
 )p
B2   4AC  0, (65)
which is true with   2b.
If b < and q > q, then there is one feasible threshold, g. As shown above
@g
@b
 0 if

  2b, and @g@b < 0 if

 > 2b. 
Proof of Corollary 2: From Table 2, the expected cost of the retention error with the
short-term performance measure is (1  )(1  b + bmI). Substituting for mI = b , an
increase in b causes the expected cost of the retention error to decrease if (1  )(2b   1) < 0,
or if  > 2b; otherwise, the expected cost of the retention error increases. Also, from Table 2,
the expected cost of the ring error with the short-term performance measure is
(1  g)(1 mCH )(xg   ). Substituting for mCH = (1 g) , an increase in g causes the
expected cost of the ring error to decrease if (xg   )[2(1 g)   1] < 0, or if  > 2(1  g);
otherwise, the expected cost of the ring error increases. 
Proof of Proposition 4: From Table 2, the total expected cost of the ring and retention errors
with the short-term performance measure is,
TE = (1  g)(1 mCH )(xg   ) + (1  )(1  b + bmI). (66)
An increase in  causes the cost of total errors to increase if,
@TE
@
=  @m
C
H
@
(1  g)(xg   ) + @m
I
@
(1  )b > 0. (67)
Substituting for @m
C
H
@ =   (1 g)2 and @m
I
@ =  b2 , then this inequality is,
@TE
@
=
(1  g)2(xg   )
2
  
2
b(1  )
2
> 0. (68)
Rearranging, @TE@ > 0 if,
g < 1  b
s
(1  )
(xg   ) .
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Note that 1  b
q
(1 )
(xg ) > 1  b, which is the assumed lower bound for g. If
g  1  b
q
(1 )
(xg ) , then an increase in  causes the cost of total errors to decrease. 
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Appendix B
In this Appendix, I analyze the case with no performance measurement bias, i.e., g = b = ,
and then use a numerical example to show that the results are similar to the case with bias. To
ensure that the short-term performance is informative without bias, i.e., Pr(yhjxg) > Pr(y`jxg);
and Pr(y`jxb) > Pr(yhjxg), I assume 2  1 > 0, or  > 12 .
Substituting for g = b = , with no manipulation, the principals expected prots with
the short-term performance measure are,
UPFNoM = [xg + (1  )] + (1  ). (69)
As with the case with bias, the principals expected prots are increasing in the accuracy of the
performance measure, or,
@UPFNoM
@
= (xg   ) + (1  ) > 0:
Turning to the setting with manipulation, the competent agents optimal manipulation e¤ort
is as follows, depending on his productive e¤ort:
mCH =
8<:
(1 )
 if

 > (1  )
1 if   (1  )
(70)
mCL =
8<:
[q(1 )+(1 q)]
 if

 > q(1  ) + (1  q)
1 if   q(1  ) + (1  q)
(71)
The incompetent agents optimal manipulation e¤ort is,
mI =
8<:  if  > 1 if    (72)
In the following, I assume that  > , which means that the incompetent agents manipulation
is not perfect. Then, the principals expected prots with manipulation and with the short-term
performance measure are,
UPF = f[+ (1  )mCH ]xg + (1  )(1 mCH )]g
+(1  )(1 mI). (73)
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The principals expected prots are increasing in the accuracy of the performance measure if,
@UPF
@
= (xg   )[1  2(1  )

] + (1  )[1  2

] > 0:
Rearranging, this is,


> b  2[(xg   )(1  ) + (1  )]
(xg   ) + (1  ) .
Note that b >  only if  is not too large, or if  < 2(xg )3(xg ) (1 ) < 1. This implies that without
bias, similar to the case with bias, the principals expected prots can be increasing or decreasing
in the accuracy of the performance measure, with  > . When

  , the incompetent agents
manipulation e¤ort is perfect, the principal never res the agent, and the principals expected
prots are independent of the accuracy of the performance measure.
Finally, I use a numerical example to demonstrate that the principals preference for no short-
term performance measure without bias is similar to the setting with bias. Figure 6 illustrates the
principals expected prots with no bias, as a function of the accuracy of the performance measure,
both without manipulation (Panel A) and with manipulation (Panel B).
Insert Figure 6
Specically, Panel A of Figure 6 shows that without manipulation, the principal prefers
no short-term performance measure, when it is less informative, i.e., when  is su¢ ciently small,
which is similar to the result in Proposition 1, as illustrated in Figure 3. Panel B of Figure 6
demonstrates that with manipulation, the principal prefers no short-term performance measure for
an intermediate level of the accuracy of the performance measure. This is the similar to Proposition
3, as illustrated in Figure 4.
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Panel A: Competent agent chooses high effort, eH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Competent agent chooses low effort, eL 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Relationship between short-term performance measure, y, and long-term firm value, x, 
depending on the competent agent's effort, e.  
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Figure 2 Relationship between short-term performance measure, y, and long-term firm value, x, given 
incompetent agent's effort. 
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Panel A: Effect of lg, given lb    Panel B: Effect of lb, given lg 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Effect of measurement error, lg and lb, on the principal’s expected profits, with and without the 
short-term performance measure, and without manipulation. 
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Figure 4 Effect of measurement error, lg and lb, on the principal’s expected profits, with and without the 
short-term performance measure, and with manipulation. 
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Panel A: Low lg     Panel B: High lg 
 
Figure 5 Effect of the agent’s cost of manipulation on the total cost of the errors with and without a short-
term performance measure. 
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Panel A: No Manipulation    Panel B: With Manipulation  
 
Figure 6: Numerical example of the effect of measurement error without bias, l, on the principal’s 
expected profits, with and without the short-term performance measure. The parameters are: q = 0.5, k = 
6.6, p = 7, xg = 25, f = 10, and q = .9505. 
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